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Many industries such as banking cards, electronic transaction intermediaries, 
web search engines, recruitment websites, the Medias, shopping malls and house 
agencies are two-sided markets. Companies connecting different groups in two-sided 
markets are called platforms. Typically, two-sided markets have a “subsidy side”, that 
is, a group of users who, when attracted in volume, are highly valued by the “money 
side”, the other user group. Because the number of subsidy-side users is crucial to 
developing strong network effects, the platform sets prices for that side below the 
level it would charge if it viewed the subsidy side as an independent market. The goal 
is to generate “cross-side” network effects. The challenge for the platform is how to 
attract subsidy side users. Tying could be used as a subsidy tool to attract users to join 
platforms in order to improve the platforms’ network effects. As a result, platforms 
could set prices higher in “money side” which improves the platforms’ profit. 
The thesis mainly discusses the strategic use of tying to improve platform’s 
profitability. Firstly, the thesis analyses the effectiveness of tying as a subsidy tool, 
which means platforms could improve profit by tying. Secondly, the thesis 
constructed a two-stage game of duopoly competition. In the case of both sides 
single-homing, tying not only reduces competitor’s profit, but also does harm to 
platform itself. The larger the extent of asymmetry in externalities between the two 
sides, the worse the competitor will be harmed. Tying will do less harm to competitor 
when platform differentiation is obvious. In the case of competitive bottleneck, which 
one side single-homing and the other side multi-homing, whether tying could or 
couldn’t improve platform’s profit depends on cross-network externality, platform 
differentiation and reservation price of the tied product. When the cross-network 
externality is large enough, platform always benefit from tying. It shows that tying 
always reduces competitor’s profit in two-sided markets of competitive bottleneck.  
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回顾过去 30 年《财富》500 强企业名录的变更，淘汰率从 20 世纪 80 年代的
30%增至 2000 年的 54%，新经济时代的企业竞争越来越激烈，相当数量的一批
产业，诸如软件产业、银行卡产业、互联网产业、电子商务产业、传媒产业等，
这些产业中的竞争已经不再是个体公司的竞争，而是类似“商业生态系统”之间
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